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INTRODUCTION
This Court granted writs of certiorari to review two issues raised by the employer
("Media-Paymaster") and the Utah Labor Commission (jointly "Petitioners"): 1)
whether the court of appeals erred in requiring the employer to disprove the employee's
claim of permanent total disability; and 2) whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing
the Commission's factual findings for abuse of discretion rather than substantial
evidence. Petitioners demonstrated in their opening brief that the Workers'
Compensation Act plainly places the burden of proof for permanent total disability on the
employee asserting the claim. (Pet. Brf. 12-22.) Petitioners also demonstrated that the
Administrative Procedures Act expressly imposes a substantial evidence standard for
review of agency factual determinations. (Pet. Brf. 22-28.) Accordingly, this Court
should reverse the court of appeals on both issues presented.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY PLACED THE
BURDEN OF PROOF FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY ON
THE EMPLOYER.
Respondent Martinez, the employee, argues that the court of appeals correctly
placed the burden of proof on the employer based on the language of the statute,
legislative intent, and public policy. However, Martinez' arguments have no merit.
Martinez concedes that the plain language of the statute controls the interpretation, and
that if the statute contains no ambiguity, the Court need not resort to legislative history or
policy considerations. (Resp. Brf. 14.)
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A.

Statutory Interpretation
Martinez argues that because U.C.A. § 34A-2-413(l)(b) expressly places the

burden of proof for permanent total disability on the employee, and subsection (l)(c),
which lists the elements of permanent total disability, makes no further mention of
burden of proof, the employer must have the burden to prove those elements. (Id. at 1416.) However, this reasoning is both irrational and unsupported by the law. Subsection
(l)(c) makes no mention of burden of proof precisely because the preceding subsection
already expressly placed the burden of proof on the employee, and subsection (c) merely
lists the elements that the employee must prove to establish permanent total disability.
Martinez later argues that the "omission" of a separate burden of proof in
subsection (c) can only mean that the Legislature intended to shift the burden of proof to
the employer, as evidenced by the period after subsection (b). (Id. at 24-26.) However,
the period merely ends the sentence comprising subsection (b); it does not signal a
change of subject matter or burden of proof in subsection (c).
The absence of a further reference to burden of proof in subsection (c) is stronger
proof of no change in the burden of proof than of change. Given the Legislature5 s
express designation of burden of proof in subsection (b), its silence on the burden in the
following subsection, dealing more specifically with the same subject, can only be
interpreted as purposeful, to leave the burden of proof unchanged. The Legislature
cannot be expected to repeat the burden of proof in successive subsections of the same
statute dealing with the same subject. The express reference to burden of proof in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.; 2

.

subsection (b) demonstrates the Legislature's awareness of the issue and its ability to
change the burden for subsection (c) had it so intended. Had the Legislature intended to
shift the burden of proof to the employer in subsection (c), it would have stated the
burden expressly, as it did in subsection (b). Therefore, the absence of a further reference
to burden of proof in subsection (c) must be interpreted not to change the burden of
proof, but rather to leave it unchanged.
Martinez concedes that he is required by subsection (b) to prove that he "is
permanently totally disabled" and argues that once "those facts" are proven, he is entitled
to benefits, and the burden then shifts to the employer to disprove the elements in
subsection (c). (Resp. Brf. 15-16, 25-26.) However, this reasoning fails to disclose what
"facts" the employee must prove to establish permanent total disability. This argument
ignores that permanent total disability can be established only by proving the elements
listed in subsection (c), which include a showing that the employee's impairment
prevents him from performing his prior work or any other work reasonably available.
How can the employee prove permanent total disability, as required by subsection (b),
without proving his inability to work, as set forth in subsection (c)? The argument is
irrational and unworkable. Proof of permanent total disability, as required in subsection
(b), can be established only by proof that the employee is unable to perform prior or other
available work, as set forth in subsection (c). Splitting the burden of proof between the
two subsections is impractical and nonsensical. If the employer is required to disprove
the elements of permanent total disability in subsection (c), then the employee's express
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burden of proof in subsection (b) is assumed by the employer, and the plain meaning of
the statute is defeated.
By its plain terms, subsection (b) requires the employee to prove that he is
"permanently totally disabled," and subsection (c) sets forth the elements of proof that the
Commission must find from the employee's evidence to reach a conclusion of permanent
total disability. Nowhere does subsection (c) change the burden of proof to the employer.
As further evidence of this plain reading of the statute, the elements of proof in
subsection (c) are phrased in terms of the employee's proof. That is, the employee must
prove that (i) "the employee is not gainfully employed"; (ii) "the employee has an
impairment"; (iii) the impairment "prevents] the employee from performing the essential
functions of the [prior] work"; and (iv) "the employee cannot perform other work
reasonably available." To impose a burden of disproof on the employer requires a
revision of the statutory language, requiring the employer to prove that (i) "the employee
is .. . gainfully employed," deleting the word "not"; (ii) "the employee [does not have]
an impairment," changing the word "has " to the words "does not have "; (iii) the
impairment "[does not] prevent the employee from performing the essential functions" of
his prior work, inserting the words "does not, "; and (iv) "the employee [can] perform
other work reasonably available," changing the word "cannot" to "can, " Thus, the
interpretation of the court of appeals, urged by Martinez, requires a complete reversal of
the statutory language that is inconsistent with its plain meaning. See, e.g., Luckau v.
Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah App. 1992) ("In interpreting a statute, courts
should avoid adding to or deleting from statutory language

").
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In summary, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous in requiring the
employee to prove permanent total disability, as defined by the elements listed in
subsection (c). This interpretation is consistent with the general burden of proof
provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act requiring the employee to establish
entitlement to the compensation claimed. See U.C.A. § 34A-2-417(2)(a) and (4)(a)
(which Martinez fails to address). By contrast, the interpretation adopted by the court of
appeals and urged by Martinez is forced, unworkable, and effects a judicial revision of
the plain language of the statute. Because the language of 34A-2-413(l)(b)-(c) is
unambiguous on its face, no resort to legislative history or public policy is required, as
Martinez concedes. However, a reply to those alternative arguments is provided in the
event they are reached by the Court.
B.

Legislative Intent
1.

1995 Enactment

As set forth in the Brief of Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund, page 5,
the legislative history of section 34A-2-413, passed in 1995, shows an intent to place the
burden of proof for permanent total disability on the injured worker:
SENATOR STEEL: Mr. President, I would like to (inaudible) you
have an opportunity to make sure you are looking at the Bill. To recognize
its intention, two-fold:
The first is to discuss the definition of permanent, total disability.
Senate Bill 123 delineates the requirements which a worker. . . must meet
in order to be permanent, totally disabled following an industrial accident

. . . It defines permanent, total disability as occurring when the
employee is not gainfully employed, is unable to do basic work activities,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cannot perform the essential functions of the work for which he is qualified,
and cannot perform other work reasonably available
[Legislative
Proceedings Before the Utah Senate, S.B. 123, Tape 33, Feb. 21, 1995, pp.
2-3, emp. add.; Amicus Brief, Add.]
Thus, the burden of proof for permanent total disability, which no one questioned,
was understood to be on the "worker," or employee. The definition of permanent total
disability, which included a showing that the employee "cannot perform the essential
functions of the work for which he is qualified, and cannot perform other work
reasonably available," is codified in subsection 34A-2-413(l)(c). Accordingly, the
Legislature intended that the employee would be required to prove the employee's own
inability to perform the prior work or any other available work.
The second purpose of the bill was to provide a procedure for employers to retrain
or rehabilitate employees adjudicated to have a permanent total disability, to enable the
employee to reenter the workforce:
SENATOR STEEL: . . . .
. . . This Bill also establishes a mechanism whereby
employers may provide or locate for a permanently, totally disabled
employee reasonable medically appropriate part-time work in a job earning
at least a minimum wage.

One of the worst things that has happened in past experiences is a
lack of rehabilitation. But this series of bills . . . is a process of trying to
provide every opportunity for rehabilitation.
More than that, this Bill.. . provides an opportunity for the
employer to help that employee continue to make contributions. It may not
be in exactly the same setting as before, but the opportunity for that person
to continue to work, to make a contribution, I think is a vital element of
what we are trying to establish here. [Id. at 4-5.]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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These rehabilitation and reemployment provisions are codified in sections 34A-2413(6) and (7). As set forth in subsection (6)(a), these provisions apply only after &
Commission determination of permanent total disability and should not, therefore, be
confused with what the employee is required to prove under subsection (l)(c) to establish
permanent total disability in the first instance.
As discussed in the referenced amicus brief, the Commission has consistently
interpreted 34A-2-413(l) according to this legislative intent, placing the burden of proof
for permanent total disability on the employee asserting the claim. {See Amicus Brf,
Addendum, Labor Commission Cases.) As discussed in Petitioners' Joint Opening Brief,
both this Court and the court of appeals have also previously read 34A-2-413(l) to
require the injured employee to prove the elements of permanent total disability in
subsection (l)(c). See Thomas v. Color Country Mgt., 2004 UT 12,1} 20, 84 P.3d 1201;
Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 491, ^f 12, 128 P.3d 31; Intermountain
Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm % 2002 UT App 164, \ 7, 48 P.3d 252. Even Martinez' own
Motion for Review before the Labor Commission in this case assumed that he had the
burden of proof, asserting repeatedly that he had "satisfied" the elements of subsection
(l)(c). (See Resp. Brf, Add. 97-101: "Under Step (iv), an employee must show that
there is no work reasonably available." Id. at 100, emp. add.) Not until the court of
appeals decision in this case has the burden of proof for permanent total disability ever
been thought to rest on the employer.
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2.

2006 Amendment

In response to the court of appeals decision in this case, the 2006 Legislature
amended 34A-2-413(l) to clarify its original intent that the burden of proof for a
permanent total disability claim rests on the employee. The Senate sponsor explained the
purpose of the amendment, set forth in House Bill 150:
SENATOR MAYNE: Basically, first of all HB 150 clarifies the
long standing view that it is the worker's burden of proof to show an
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. A recent court of appeals
case removes much of that employee's burden in this regard. Correcting
this error will avoid an increase in claims costs associated with more
permanent total disability cases generated because of the relaxation of the
employees' burden of proof. [Senate Day 45, 2006 General Session; Resp.
Brf,Add. 10, emp. add.]
The Legislature passed HB 150 with little or no opposition, and it became effective May
1, 2006. (Id. at 3, 10; Minutes of the House Business and Labor Standing Committee,
Feb. 6, 2006, Resp. Brf, Add. 5.)
House Bill 150, which also made other modifications to the Workers'
Compensation Act, states in its title that the bill "clarifies burden of proof in permanent
total disability claims." (Id. at 12.) That clarification is found in section 34A-2-413(l),
as follows:
(b)

To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation,
the employee must prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(ii)

(c)

the employee is permanently totally disabled . . . .

To establish that an employee is_ permanently totally disabled the
employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(iii)

(iv)

the . . . impairment... prevents] the employee from
performing the essential functions of the [prior] work . . . ;
and
the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available
[Emp. in orig. showing changes; Resp. Brf., Add. 25.]

Thus, the bill clarifies that the employee's burden of proof applies to subsection
(l)(c) as well as (l)(b). Section 8 of House Bill 150 adds language of legislative intent to
emphasize that the amendment does not change the law, but merely clarifies the law as it
existed when originally passed in 1995, as well as when this case commenced:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments to Section
34A-2-413 in this bill be interpreted as merely clarifying an existing
principle that the employee bears the burden of proving that the employee
is permanently totally disabled based on those factors listed as matters on
which the commission is to make a conclusion in Subsection 34A-2413(l)(c), as enacted before the amendments of this bill. [Id. at 35-36,
emp. add.]
Martinez argues that the amendment to 34A-2-413(l) regarding burden of proof is
invalid as violating the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches
of government. He argues that the amendment makes a substantive change in the law
that cannot apply retroactively to this pending case. (Resp. Brf. 18-24.) However, the
cases cited by Martinez are easily distinguishable from the present case. For example, in
In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 673 F. Supp. 411 (D.
Wash. 1987), the Washington Legislature amended the state securities law, which was
previously silent on standard of fault, to insert a high standard that would shield public
entities from liability on construction bonds. Moreover, a subsequent amendment
expressly made the standard of fault retroactive to apply to the case then pending against
those public entities in federal court. The court held that the second amendment, making
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the prior substantive change retroactive, violated the principle of separation of powers
because it was an attempt "to usurp and displace judicial power" by altering the
substantive law that determined the outcome in that pending case. Id. at 416.
By contrast, the doctrine of separation of powers does not prohibit the legislature
from clarifying its intent regarding a prior enactment. Utah courts have consistently
recognized this legislative authority. For example, in the leading case of State v. Higgs,
656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982), this Court held that a procedural amendment to the Personnel
Management Act while the case was pending on appeal applied to the pending case. The
Court explained that when a statutory change is procedural, or "when the purpose of an
amendment is to clarify the meaning of an earlier enactment, the amendment may be
applied retroactively in pending actions." {Id. at 1001, emp. add.) As stated in Okland
Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974), the rule against
retroactive application of statutory amendments "has no application where the later
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as to how the law
should have been understood prior to its enactment." (Emp. add.) See also Olsen v.
SamuelMclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (construing Workers9
Compensation Act: "[a]n exception to the general rule against retroactivity applies to
changes which are procedural only or amendments which clarify statutes") (emp. add.,
citation omitted); Visitor Info. Center Authority v. State Tax Comm 'n, 930 P.2d 1196,
1198 (Utah 1997) (while an amendment may be presumed to change existing rights, "[a]n
exception to this presumption exists when the amendment was intended to clarify a
preexisting intention'") (emp. add.); Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1995) ("an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exception [to nonretroactivity] exists for amendments clarifying statutes, which are
applied retroactively") (emp. add.).
Illustration of the rule allowing retroactive application of clarifying amendments is
found in Shelter America Corp. v. Ohio Casualty and Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843 (Utah App.
1987). There, the plaintiff sought recovery under a motor vehicle dealer's bond, and the
issue was whether the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" included mobile homes.
While the case was pending on appeal, the Legislature amended the statutory definition
expressly to include mobile homes. Relying on State v. Higgs, supra, the court held that
the amendment applied to the pending appeal because its purpose was "to clarify the
meaning" of the earlier statutory definition. Id. at 845. Referring to the title of the
statute, the court noted its express purpose of "clarifying definition section." Id. The
court held that the amendment "merely clarified the intended meaning of the earlier
statute that a mobile home is included in the definition of a motor vehicle. Plaintiffs
claims are therefore within the scope of the bond." Id. Similarly, in D.B. v. State, 925
P.2d 178 (Utah App. 1996), the court construed the amended definition of the robbery
statute. The court concluded that while the original statute was sufficiently clear, the
amended statute could be applied to reach the same result because the amendment was
intended "to clarify any perceived ambiguity in the previous statute." Id. at 182 n.5
("[wjhen a statute is ambiguous, amendment of the statute may indicate a legislative
purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change the law") (citation
omitted).
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In this case, the court of appeals concluded that section 34A-2-413(l)(c) was
ambiguous and then interpreted it to impose the burden of proof on the employer. The
Legislature responded with an amendment to clarify the intent of the original enactment
to place the burden of proof on the employee. The title of House Bill 150 expressly states
that its purpose is to "clarify [y] [the] burden of proof in permanent total disability
claims." (Resp. Brf, Add. 12.) The amendment to 34A-2-413(l)(c) inserts the language
that "the employee must prove" the listed elements to establish permanent total disability.
(Id at 25.) The "Legislative intent language" emphasizes that the Legislature is not
changing the law, but "merely clarifying an existing principle that the employee bears the
burden of proving . . . those factors listed . . . in Subsection 34A-2-413(l)(c), as enacted
before the amendments of this bill" (Id. at 36.) Accordingly, the amendment merely
clarifies the preexisting law, as the Labor Commission, prior courts, and prior litigants
(including Martinez) understood it to be prior to the court of appeals decision in this case.
Because the amendment merely clarifies a perceived ambiguity and declares the
legislative intent of the original enactment, without altering substantive rights, the
amendment should be applied to this pending appeal to reverse the court of appeals'
faulty interpretation of the statutory burden of proof.
C.

Prior Common Law
Martinez argues that the court of appeals decision on burden of proof for 34A-2-

413(l)(c) should be affirmed because "it is consistent with common law" that existed
prior to the current statute. (Resp. Brf. 28.) Martinez refers to cases decided under the
common law "odd-lot doctrine." (Id. at 28-31.) However, those common law cases are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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consistent with requiring the employee to prove inability to perform the prior work or
other available work, as set forth in subsection (c)(iii)-(iv).
JnHardman v. Salt Lake Fleet Mgt., 725 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1986), this Court
summarized prior case law setting forth the general requirements for an injured employee
to establish permanent total disability:
The [prior] Act does not set forth, however, those often unquantifiable
factors that establish permanent total disability, even on a tentative basis.
We are therefore compelled to examine the law as it has evolved within the
framework of our cases. This Court has stated, with regard to permanent
total disability claims, that a worker may be found totally disabled if he can
no longer perform work of the general nature he was performing when
injured, or "any other work which a man of his capabilities may be able to
do, " or to learn to do or for which he might be trained. [Emp. add.,
citation omitted.]
Thus, the cases have consistently required proof on the same two factors now codified in
subsection (c)(iii)-(iv): the employee's inability to perform his prior work activities and
inability to perform any other work for which he might be rehabilitated or trained.
As set forth in Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah
1987), quoted by Martinez, the common law required the employee to prove these two
points:
The employee must first present a prima facie case that no regular,
dependable work is available to him. To do this, the employee must present
"eyidence that he can no longer perform the duties required in his
occupation and that he cannot be rehabilitated" to perform some other type
of employment. [Emp. add., citation omitted.]
Again, these same two elements, which the employee was required to prove under the
common law, are now codified in subsection (c)(iii)-(iv). Only after the employee met
this burden of proof did the burden shift to the employer "to prove the existence of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

regular, steady work that the employee can perform, taking into account the employee's
education, [work experience,] mental capacity and age." {Id.) Thus, the employer could
essentially provide rebuttal evidence that the employee could "perform his job or the
duties of any other job generally available." {Id. at 577.)
Subsequent case law emphasized that "the employee has the initial burden to
prove" inability to perform the duties of the prior occupation or other work, and that "[i]f
the employee fails in meeting these burdens, the employer's burden to prove the
existence of actual work the employee can perform is not triggered." Hoskings v.
Industrial Comm'w, 918 P.2d 150, 155-56 (Utah App. 1996). Moreover, even then, the
employer was required to show only that other employment was reasonably available:
"Of course, the employer does not become an employment agency for the applicant. The
employer is not required to find a particular position for an applicant

Rather, the

employer must only prove that an actual job does exist... and that [the employee] has a
reasonable opportunity to be employed in that job." {Id. at 158 n.9.) See also Zupon v.
Industrial Comm 'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah App. 1993) (as a predicate of the foregoing
analysis, claimant must first establish inability to work caused by an industrial injury).
Accordingly, under the common law, the employee was required to prove the
same four elements now codified in subsection (c)(i)-(iv), including inability to perform
the prior work or other available work. The only difference is that the factors affecting
other employment, in addition to disability, such as age, education, experience, and
capacity, are now included as part of the employee's proof in subsection (c)(iv). While
the employee has the burden of proof on elements (c)(i)-(iv) to establish permanent total
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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disability under the statute, the employer may, of course, provide rebuttal evidence on
those elements. The burden-shifting procedure under the common law is now essentially
codified in 34A-2-413(6), which recognizes a finding of permanent total disability as
"not final" and allows the employer to respond with a reemployment plan based on
rehabilitation and retraining of the employee as necessary "to return the employee to
gainful employment." Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
In summary, the prior common law is consistent with requiring the employee to
prove the elements of permanent total disability in subsection (c)(i)-(iv). To the extent
the common law is different from the current statute, the statute must be enforced as
written. See U.C.A. § 68-3-1 (common law is applicable only insofar as it is consistent
with statutory law); Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah
1982) ("where a conflict arises between the common law and a statute . . . , the common
law must yield").
D.

Public Policy
Finally, Martinez argues that if section 34A-2-413(l) is considered ambiguous,

this Court should construe it "liberally" in favor of awarding permanent total disability
benefits. (Resp. Brf. 32.) However, "liberal" construction applies only "when statutory
terms reasonably admit of such a construction." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d
676, 679 (Utah 1990). Here, the plain terms of 34A-2-413(l)(b)-(c), as confirmed by the
2006 clarifying amendment, do not reasonably admit of a construction that shifts the
burden of proof to the employer. Liberal construction is not a license to ignore the
language of the statute. Moreover, under Utah law, all statutes in derogation of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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common law "are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes
and to promote justice." U.C.A. § 68-3-2. Accordingly, the statute must be construed
not just to pay benefits, but also "to promote justice."
POINT II:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REVIEWED THE
COMMISSION'S FACTUAL FINDINGS FOR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.1

Martinez challenges two key factual findings of the Labor Commission under
34A-2-413(l)(c): First, under subsection (l)(c)(iii), that Martinez is capable of
performing the "essential functions" of the fast-food work for which he was qualified at
the time of his accident; and second, under subsection (l)(c)(iv), that Martinez is capable
of performing "other work reasonably available." Martinez argues that the court of
appeals correctly reviewed these findings for abuse of discretion. (Resp. Brf. 34-35.)
However, this argument finds no support in the law.
A.

Correct Standard for Review of Factual Findings
Martinez argues rather vaguely that "the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed for

abuse of discretion, where the statute conferred discretion to the Commission." (Resp.
Brf. 34.) This assertion glosses over and fails to specify exactly what the court of appeals
was reviewing, what statute conferred discretion to the Commission, and what discretion
1

Martinez first argues that the court of appeals properly applied a correction-oferror standard of review to the issue of burden of proof, discussed in Point I. (Resp. Brf.
33-34.) However, the standard of review applied by the court of appeals for the correct
burden of proof is not in dispute. The issue was not addressed in the court of appeals
because that court raised burden of proof sua sponte. Neither is the issue included in this
Court's orders granting review. (Pet. Brf, Add. 1-2.) For purposes of this Court's
review of the court of appeals' ruling on burden of proof, a correction-of-error standard
applies. (Pet. Brf. 1.) The issue now under consideration is whether the court of appeals
applied the correct standard of review to the Commission's factual findings.
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was conferred. See Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811,813 (Utah App. 1992)
(requiring the claimant "to specifically identify the grant of discretion if one is claimed").
Martinez appears to argue that section 34A-2-413(l)(c) grants "discretion" to the
Commission to determine whether the employee is capable of performing the essential
functions of the prior employment, (c)(iii), or other work reasonably available, (c)(iv);
that those determinations are "mixed questions of law and fact"; and that those
determinations are therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. {Id. at 34-35.) However,
this argument mischaracterizes the statute and the nature of the required determinations.
At the commencement of this case, section 34A-2-413(l)(c) stated: "To find an
employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that: . . . (iii) the .
. . impairment... prevents] the employee from performing the essential functions of the
[prior] work . . . ; and (iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available." (Pet. Brf., Add. 108, emp. add.) Thus, the statute imposed on the
Commission the duty to find those facts essential to support a legal conclusion of
"permanent total disability." Whether an employee is capable of performing prior work
or any other available work is plainly a factual determination. Specifically, whether
Martinez can make a sandwich, or sweep with a broom, or carry out a bag of garbage is
purely factual in nature; it is not a question of law or even a mixed question of law and
fact. Factual findings that the employee is incapable of performing the prior work or
some other work are required to support a legal conclusion of permanent total disability.
Accordingly, Martinez' argument that the elements in subsection (l)(c) are legal
conclusions reviewed for abuse of discretion is erroneous. See Hodges v. Western Piling
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and Sheeting Co., Ill P.2d 718, 721 (Utah 1986) ("determination whether an individual
is permanently and totally disabled is a factual question . . . and will not be set aside by
this Court unless there is no substantial evidence in the record to support it"); Zions First
Nat'I Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988) (a factual
finding should be treated as a finding of fact regardless of whether labeled as a
"conclusion").
The 2006 amendment to subsection (l)(c), which now governs this appeal, as
discussed in Point LB.2., above, states: "To establish that an employee is permanently
totally disabled, the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence" elements
(iii) and (iv), as left unchanged and quoted above. (Resp. Brfi, Add. 25.) Thus, the
amendment merely clarifies that the employee must prove the factual elements in
subsection (l)(c) to establish permanent total disability. The legal duty of the
Commission to determine the facts and apply the law is still based on the general
statutory authority inU.C.A. §§ 34A-1-301, -303(4), and 34A-2-801(5)-(6). Therefore,
the Commission does not have the "discretion" to find the facts and apply the law, but the
legal duty to do so.
The standards for review of Commission factual findings and legal conclusions are
plainly set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), section 63-46b-16(4).
Subsection (4)(d) provides for correction of legal conclusions, and subsection (4)(g)
provides for review of factual findings. Regarding factual findings, the appellate court
may grant relief only if, "on the basis of the agency's record," the claimant "has been
substantially prejudiced" because "the agency action is based upon a determination of
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fact. . . that is not supported by substantial evidence" (Pet. Brf., Add. 116, emp. add.)
Subsection (4)(h)(i) provides for relief when agency action is "an abuse of discretion
delegated to the agency by statute." (Id.)
In this case, Martinez challenges the Commission factual findings that he can
perform the "essential functions" of his prior fast-food work or "other work reasonably
available." 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iii)-(iv). As set forth above, an appellate court may set
aside those agency factual findings only if they are "not supported by substantial
evidence." 63-46b-16(4)(g). To obtain relief under this standard, the challenger must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that such evidence
is insubstantial. (See Pet. Brf. at 25-26.) Martinez has made no attempt to satisfy the
marshaling requirement, either in the court of appeals or in this Court. Therefore, the
findings must be affirmed. E.g., Whitear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982, 984-85 (Utah
App. 1998).
To circumvent the foregoing standard of review, Martinez argues that 34A-2413(l)(c) grants the Commission "discretion to apply the law to the facts," and that the
Commission's findings and conclusions should therefore be reviewed for abuse of
discretion under 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). (Resp. Brf. 35.) However, this argument confuses
and obscures the correct analysis. Interpretations or applications of the law are reviewed
for correctness under subsection (4)(d), and factual findings are reviewed for substantial
evidence under subsection (4)(g); the APA contains no hybrid standard of review for
applications of law to fact. The abuse-of-discretion standard in subsection (4)(h)(i) has
no application in this case because Martinez is challenging factual findings, not
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discretionary action of the Labor Commission. If Martinez' argument were accepted,
findings of fact in every case could be reviewed for abuse of discretion under the pretext
that such findings are "discretionary," and the express terms of the APA would be
defeated.2
B.

The Findings Are Supported by Substantial Evidence
Rather than marshal the evidence in support of the findings, Martinez simply

reargues the evidence, "which is a futile tactic on appeal." Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor
Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 491, Tf 27, 128 P.3d 31. Martinez asserts that Media-Paymaster's
"only witness" testified that "there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform." (Resp.
Brf. 36.) This is a false characterization of the evidence.
The evidence must be viewed in the context of the disputed statutory elements of
permanent total disability: ability to perform the "essential functions" of the prior fastfood work or "other work reasonably available." 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iii)-(iv). Martinez
testified that the essential functions of his prior fast-food work included cleaning, making
sandwiches, mopping, sweeping, and removing garbage. (Tr. 28-29.) Kit Bertsch,

2

The assertion of the court of appeals that it did "not review the Commission's
factual findings," but considered only whether the Commission "abused its discretion" in
determining that Martinez could perfonn his prior work or other work, is less than candid
and is the source of Martinez' misdirected analysis. (Slip Op., If 11, Pet. Brf, Add. 7.)
Again, whether Martinez can perform certain functions is & factual matter, and the court
of appeals did review and set aside the Commission's factual findings. Whether those
findings are labeled "conclusions" is immaterial to judicial review; they are still findings
of fact and must be treated as such. See Zions First Nat'I Bank, supra, at 656. The court
of appeals simply disagreed with those factual findings and substituted its judgment for
that of the Commission through a false standard of review that has no basis in law. See
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate
court cannot reweigh the evidence and make its own findings).
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Media-Paymaster's vocational expert, compared these essential functions with Martinez'
current abilities and concluded that he "currently possesses the skill and experience
necessary to perform this past relevant job

Based on all information noted in this

report and reviewed for Mr. Martinez, and based on the fact that he is able to perform
LIGHT category work . . . 5 it appears that Mr. Martinez is employable in his past
occupation of Fast Food Clerk" (Pet. Brf, Add. 75, emp. add.) In a follow-up report,
Bertsch concluded that "Mr. Martinez may return to his past work of choice with the
same employer and in the same job." {Id. at 77, emp. add.) At the Commission hearing,
Bertsch testified that Martinez could still perform the essential functions of his prior
employment even if those essential functions were modified to accommodate his physical
capacity. (Tr. 115-16.)
Regarding "other work reasonably available," Bertsch reported that she surveyed
several fast-food employers who had work available that could be modified to meet
Martinez' capacity. (Pet. Brf, Add. 77.) At the Commission hearing, Bertsch confirmed
that fast-food employers, including McDonalds, would modify work responsibilities as
necessary to accommodate Martinez' limitations. (Tr. 114-24.) The testimony cited by
Martinez and the court of appeals that such specific jobs are not presently in existence is
not inconsistent with Bertsch's testimony that such work is "reasonably available. " The
statute does not require proof of an actual job, only that work within Martinez' ability be
"reasonably available." Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Commission's
findings that Martinez is capable of performing either the essential functions of his prior
fast-food work, or of performing other fast-food work that is reasonably available.
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Assertions by the court of appeals and Martinez that the Commission "ignored"
certain testimony amount to an improper reweighing of the evidence on appeal.
Specifically, the Commission did not "ignore" Martinez' sitting and standing limitations
(Slip Op., f 13); rather, the Commission found that in light of all the evidence, changing
from sitting to standing every 30 to 60 minutes would not prevent Martinez from
performing his essential sandwich-making and cleaning functions. (Pet. Brf, Add. 10.)
Neither did the Commission "ignore" testimony that "no [fast-food] jobs were available"
that Martinez could perform. (Slip Op., f 16.) As shown above, that assertion does not
accurately represent Bertsch5s report and testimony. Moreover, the Commission
specifically addressed the Bertsch evidence: "Media has presented persuasive evidence
that many employers in the fast-food business have work immediately available for
someone with Mr. Martinez'background and abilities." (Pet. Brf., Add. 12.) "Ms.
Bertsch testified and reported . . . that in the fast food/cashier position, six to ten part-time
and two to four full-time, benefited positions are available in the Ogden and North Ogden
area.... Ms. Bertsch testified that these employers are able to accommodate Petitioner's
limitations through modifying non-essential functions, varying schedules, and through
the use of assistive devices." (Id. at 16.)
Accordingly, the Commission did not "ignore" the testimony; it simply made
findings on the basis of the evidence with which the court of appeals disagreed.
However, it is the role of the Commission, not the appellate court, to weigh the
conflicting evidence, draw inferences, and make findings on the basis of that evidence.
The role of the appellate court, regardless of its agreement with the findings, is limited to
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reviewing whether the findings are supported by "substantial evidence." Here, the court
of appeals plainly exceeded its proper role by substituting its view of the evidence for
that of the Commission. See, e.g., Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, supra, at 68;
Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, supra, ^ 27. Therefore, the court of appeals decision
must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments set forth in Petitioners' Joint Opening Brief and this Joint
Reply Brief, this Court should reverse the decision of the court of appeals and order that
the decision of the Labor Commission, denying permanent total disability benefits, be
affirmed.
DATED this £S

day of April, 2006.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON & McCONKIE
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Martinez also questions the adequacy of the Commission's findings of fact.
(Resp. Brf. 40-41.) However, that matter is not within the scope of the issues on which
this Court granted review. (Pet. Brf., Add. 1-2.) In any event, the Commission's findings
expressly and adequately address the statutory elements required for permanent total
disability set forth in 34A-2-413(l)(c).
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